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1. Introduction  
 
The Japanese banks, and particularly Regional Banks, have been undergoing a long period of 
restructuring and consolidation. This process can be traced back to the late 1990s. The unique 
and unprecedented consolidation process of the Japanese banking system has attracted 
substantial research interest. There have been a number of recent studies that analyze bank 
efficiency in Japan, e.g. Fukao (2008), Fukuyama and Weber (2008, 2015a, 2015b), Hoshi and 
Kashyap (2010), Assaf et al. (2011), Mamatzakis et al. (2015), among others.  
The research interest in bank efficiency has also been closely linked to the complex 
economic situation in Japan. The poorly functioning banking system, not only in the early 1990s, 
but also during the 2000s, contributed substantially to the slowdown of the Japanese economy. 
Furthermore, unusually low CPI and economic growth that have been negative or marginal to 
zero for a couple of decades, have undoubtedly affected bank performance. Recent studies by, 
e.g. Fukuyama and Weber (2008, 2015a, 2015b), Assaf et al. (2011), Barros et al. (2012), 
provide empirical evidence of the low performance in the Japanese banking sector. Montgomery 
and Shimizutani (2009) further show that costly structural and institutional reforms 
implemented by banks and the Japanese Government in the 1990s and early 2000s did not 
substantially reduce the high volume of non-performing loans (NPLs) on bank balance sheets. 
This study differs from previous research on bank efficiency in general and the Japanese 
banking sector in particular in several ways.  We provide a fresh look at the ongoing problems 
faced by the sector and propose an innovative framework to evaluate banks’ network revenue 
efficiency. We address the following research questions that have not been addressed in 
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previous Japanese banking research studies. First, we model and identify the variation 
(differences) between optimal and current bank revenue for the sector as a whole. This sort of 
analysis has been omitted from contemporary literature on bank efficiency.  
Next, we examine behavioural differences in terms of optimal and current revenue, 
between Regional Banks I and Regional Banks II. Such an analysis gives an in-depth view of 
the differences between these two types of Regional Banks.1 The applied model also allows us 
to identify how banks can adjust the individual inputs/outputs that maximize their revenue. We 
also estimate an optimal level of NPLs and compare these with the current volume of NPLs 
shown on bank balance sheets. Last, but not least, we examine a link between bank reserves and 
optimal and actual NPLs.  
In terms of methodological contribution, we build on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
and the two-stage network model introduced by Fukuyama and Weber (2010) and Fukuyama 
and Matousek (2011). Fukuyama and Weber (2015a) considered a financial regulatory 
constraint along with NPLs in a two stage network, multi-period dynamic model. Fukuyama 
and Weber (2015b) further extended the framework into Luenberger indicators. The inclusion of 
NPLs directly into the model for estimating bank efficiency has been already well established. 
Fujii et al. (2014) and Assaf et al. (2013) clearly show that omitting NPLs from the model can 
provide biased results in bank efficiency analysis. So far research has linked only NPLs with 
technical efficiency. This paper extends the traditional concept in the following directions. A 
two-stage network model for analyzing bank efficiency is fully justified by the fact that bank 
                                                  
1 In Section 2, we provide a detailed discussion about the structure of Japanese banks and other financial 
institutions. 
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deposits have to be ‘produced’ by banks. Thus, they enter into the production process at the 
second stage. The proposed model further shifts this type of research by introducing a two-stage 
network bank revenue function with NPLs. This is an important and novel contribution since we 
not only introduce NPLs into the two-stage network model, but also link NPLs with bank 
revenue and bank reserves. This model, therefore, allows us to estimate an optimal revenue that 
can be generated by banks with respect to bank reserves for NPLs. We determine bank optimal 
revenue and, at the same time, identify the optimal outputs in the production process. The 
results will then show differences between optimal and estimated revenues and inputs/outputs. 
The analysis has important managerial implications. We apply this model to Japanese Regional 
Banks to better understand the causes of low bank profitability and propose how this can be 
improved. 
The second part of the paper then applies Nerlove’s revenue inefficiency model, as 
introduced by Nerlove (1965). Following Nerlove (1965) we consider revenue maximization in 
two stages. The first stage is characterized by revenue maximization for a given production 
function, and in the second stage, maximum revenue is obtained by maximizing all possible 
production opportunities. The overall efficiency measures are broken down into allocative 
efficiency and technical efficiency, as Chambers et al (1996) show a clear advantage in using 
this type of model. Following this approach we analyze not only Nerlove’s Revenue 
inefficiency but also the individual efficiencies. This allows us to identify the main source of 
bank inefficiency that provides banks and policymakers with important information about bank 
behaviour. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of 
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the Japanese banking system and the main challenges it faces; Section 3 contains the literature 
review; Section 4 provides the methodological concept of our analysis; Section 5 discusses data 
and empirical findings; and Section 6 summarizes our results and suggests areas for further 
research.  
 
2. The Japanese Banks: An Overview 
The Japanese banking sector can be classified as a bank-based financial system. Commercial 
banks play a primary role in providing finance to businesses and households. The structure of 
banks in Japan is rather complicated. Banks can be split up into several levels. The largest banks 
with international activities include City Banks and Trust Banks. The second important group of 
banking institutions in Japan are the Regional Banks. These are divided into groups: Regional 
Banks I; and the Second Association of Regional Banks (also known as Regional Banks II). The 
third group includes Shinkin Banks (Credit banks (CBs)) and Shinyo Kumiai (Credit 
Cooperatives (CCs)), small financial institutions serving mainly households and small 
businesses. Based on this classification we can broadly say that the first two groups belong to a 
category of commercial banks. Shinkin Banks and Shinyo Kumiai are a group of typical 
mutual/cooperative financial institutions. The Japanese banking system was crippled by the 
continuous misallocation of credits and the delayed disclosure of the true level of NPLs in the 
1990s. The policy stance adopted by the Japanese Government and the Bank of Japan, which 
postponed the full disclosure of NPLs on the bank balance sheets, was self-destructive. Poor 
macroeconomic conditions and the inability of businesses to repay their debts rapidly 
deteriorated during the 1990s. Furthermore, NPLs undermined the overall performance of 
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commercial banks. A similar view was presented by Fukao (2003, 2008), Peek and Rosengren 
(2005), Watanabe (2007), Hoshi and Kashyap (2010), among others, who argued that the 
volume of NPLs was unsustainable and caused major problems for the economy as a whole. 
The financial crisis in Japan reached its height in the second half of 1997, when a large 
number of financial institutions declared bankruptcy almost on a daily basis. The turmoil 
squeezed liquidity in the financial market, since financial institutions preferred to deposit their 
money with the Bank of Japan, instead of allocating the money on the interbank market. The 
financial crisis and consequent consolidation process in the Japanese financial market can be 
split up into three phases (Fukao (2008) and Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) discuss this issue in 
depth). The first phase of the crisis occurred between 1991 and 1997 and was characterized by 
the bubble bursting and the beginning of gradual and reluctant interventions by the Japanese 
Government that hugely underestimated, in the early stage of the crisis at least, the true scale of 
the problems in the financial sector. The second phase, 1997–1999, can be labelled as the 
defining point of the near collapse of the Japanese financial market. Only then did the 
Government admit the true extent of the crisis, with the result that more systematic measures 
were implemented to rescue the system from complete collapse. Finally, the period from 1999 
to 2003 was characterized by intensive consolidation of the banking sector, but the problems of 
credit misallocation and economic stagnation continued. Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) show that 
the problems within the financial market were not associated, in this phase, with the earlier 
bubble bursting, but were a direct consequence of the policy measures applied from the late 
1990s onwards. 
Montgomery and Shimizutani (2009) analyze the (in)effectiveness of recapitalization 
 6 
 
policies in the Japanese banking sector. They reported that 180 banks failed and the total cost of 
the credit losses reached USD 950 billion from 1990 to 2003. We observe the rapid decline in 
the number of banks operating in Japan from 1990 to 2008. The consolidation and 
recapitalization process through the merger of financially distressed banks has completely 
changed the structure of the financial market place. 
Our analysis focuses on the activities of Regional Banks I and II that can be seen as a 
core banking segment within the Japanese financial system. The Japanese banking sector has 
faced severe systemic instability since the early 1990s. Several recapitalization programmes 
have been introduced by the Government in order to stabilize the system and restore lending 
activities. As extensively discussed by Packer and Zhu (2012), Japanese banks apply two sets of 
provisioning: general and specific provisions. Both types of provisions are tax-deductible and 
are part of Tier 2 capital. However, the Japanese banks are not allowed to use any discretionary 
changes to provisional requirements in response to macrofinancial conditions or sectoral 
considerations. The required provisions are estimated from the past three-year loss experience 
in each category. It is not a forward provisioning (dynamic) system that would act as 
counter-cyclical (Jiménez et al, 2012). The main regulatory changes that affected provisioning 
were changes in loan classification standards, which were particularly intense in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, when Japan tightened its loan classification guidelines. Despite extensive 
discussions about the required changes in the provisioning practices in Japan there has not been 
any change since 2002. Fujii and Kawai (2010) discuss the underestimated volume of the 
provisions created by the banks in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The problems of inadequate 
provisions were addressed by the authorities mainly in the group of the large City Banks rather 
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than in the Regional Banks. 
Regional Banks in particular had a large proportion of NPLs on their balance sheets, low 
capitalization and financial losses caused mainly by deteriorated balance sheets. More than 40 
per cent of problem loans held by Regional Banks between September 2008 and March 2009 
were reclassified as normal (Hoshi, 2011). Although in 2007, Japanese banks’ capital was 
finally claimed to have been restored (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010), it is argued that a large 
number of bad debts were disguised until the end of March 2012, in response to the Act of 
Temporary Measures to Facilitate Financing for SMEs (Hoshi, 2011). 
Recent studies by Halkos et al. (2016), Mamatzakis et al. (2015), Fukuyama and Weber 
(2010), among others, argue that that the Japanese Government’s decision not to address the 
accumulating problems within the Regional Banks meant that the situation deteriorated still 
further.  The fact is that a consolidation process should lead to the restoration of not only banks’ 
intermediary functions, but also an improvement in the efficient allocation of credits within the 
economy. To date banks’ activities are still restricted due to a lack of capital and accumulated 
NPLs.  
Halkos et al. (2016) show that mergers and acquisitions (M&As) within the regional 
banking sector could be an appropriate way of restoring bank activities and efficiency.  In 
Japan, however, M&A activity has not been seen as an effective instrument for bank 
consolidation. Although the regional banks came through the global financial crisis relatively 
unharmed their financial positions have been gradually eroding. This has been caused by a 
relatively narrow interest margin that has already caused some banks to become financially 
fragile. The reluctance to use M&As as a tool in bank restructuring and consolidation is part of 
 8 
 
the specific nature of the Japanese banking system.  
 
3. Literature Review  
The empirical research on Japanese banking is relatively rich in both quantitative and 
qualitative analyses. In the last two decades there have been a number of studies that analyze 
bank efficiency in Japan. As we discuss, Japanese banks have undergone more than a decade of 
different consolidation and restructuring processes as a consequence of the deep economic and 
banking crisis in the early 1990s. The recent studies focus on the link between NPLs and 
technical efficiency. The first published studies of Japanese banking, which include Fukuyama 
(1993, 1995), McKillop et al. (1996), Altunbas et al. (2000). Fukuyama (1993, 1995) argues that 
bank inefficiency was not caused by scale efficiency but predominantly by technical 
inefficiencies. Fukuyama (1995) shows that the economic crisis, when the asset bubble started 
to burst, had an impact on Japanese banks. However, he also points out that the impact on bank 
efficiency was different between City Banks and Regional Banks. McKillop et al. (1996) find 
that large Japanese banks can improve their efficiency by improving scale economies. Altunbas 
et al. (2000) also show that scale inefficiencies dominate X-inefficiencies within Japanese 
commercial banks. 
The majority of studies of Japanese bank efficiency apply the DEA. Fukuyama and 
Weber (2005) adopt an indirect production approach to analyze indirect input allocative 
efficiency (or Luenberger output gain function) that is derived from the directional output 
distance function and the cost-constrained directional distance function. The study compares the 
output technical efficiency calculated relative to direct and indirect output possibility sets. It 
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finds that on average indirect input allocative inefficiency increased from 1992 to 1997, and 
then declined in 1998, followed by greater inefficiency in 1999. A further study by Drake and 
Hall (2003) also applies the DEA to calculate technical and scale efficiency. The results reveal 
that City Banks do not fully utilize efficiency scale and those banks could not gain from 
reducing X-inefficiencies. A different methodological approach was introduced by Liu and Tone 
(2008). They developed a three-stage non-parametric approach to estimate bank efficiency 
during the period from 1997 to 2001. The results show a gradual increase in bank efficiency. 
Drake et al. (2009) apply a slacks-based measure to estimate bank efficiency during the period 
from 1995 to 2002. They also look at the differences between intermediation and production 
approaches, and the profit-based approach. Drake et al. (2009) reveal that different 
methodological approaches give different results.  
The research studies on Japanese bank efficiency unambiguously show that unresolved 
or partial resolution of NPLs on bank balance sheets remain an important determinant of how to 
improve bank efficiency. In the last two decades there have been numerous studies which argue 
that NPLs caused the problem not only for banks but also that they are the main barrier to 
improving economic activities. Altunbas et al. (2000) find that the share of NPLs on Japanese 
banks’ balance sheets negatively affect bank efficiency. Drake and Hall (2003) find that tackling 
the issue of NPLs is essential for improving bank efficiency. They show that the problem is 
particularly evident within the Regional Bank group. Watanabe (2007) shows a link between 
NPLs and the credit contraction in Japan in the late 1990s. Fukuyama and Weber (2008) also 
conclude that NPLs should be included in the studies on bank efficiency and cannot be ignored 
when carrying out efficiency analyses of Japanese banks. Barros et al. (2012) show that the 
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inclusion of NPLs within the efficiency model provides bank managers and regulators with an 
additional dimension to their decision-making processes. Barros et al (2012) point out that 
Japanese banks still face problems with NPLs and that a further restructuring is needed. 
Although there is anecdotal evidence about the negative impact of NPLs on Japanese 
bank efficiency, the current methodological research on bank efficiency with NPLs is still rather 
limited. The previous research on bank efficiency treated NPLs as covariates to estimate how 
they affect bank efficiency. For example, Mester (1993, 1996), Berger and De Young (1997), 
Uchida and Satake (2009) included NPLs as a proxy for asset quality. They find that NPLs have 
a negative impact on bank efficiency (Mester, 1993; Hughes and Mester, 1993). Berger and 
Mester (1997) propose the use of the ratio of NPLs to total loans as an environmental variable 
in their model. Their results support the hypothesis of so-called bad management that was 
introduced by Berger and De Young (1997). Resti (1998) uses a traditional DEA analysis to 
assess cost efficiency and technical efficiency of the post-merged Italian banks. The output 
variables try to deal with the issue of bad loans by using net of bad loans variable. Resti (1997, 
1998) proposes an output variable – performing loans – that are defined as total loans minus 
non-performing loans. In addition, there is an additional variable that is calculated as the ratio of 
bad loans to total loans. This ratio is a proxy for measuring an Italian bank’s risk.   
However, the main drawback of those studies is the fact that they do not include NPLs 
directly in the production process. As we discuss in Section 4, banks may produce two types of 
loans (output). They can produce loans that consist of the good loans that are jointly produced 
with bad loans. The second type of loans that banks underwrite (produce) are only good quality 
loans. Färe et al. (1989) show that it is appropriate to analyze desirable outputs (loans) and 
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undesirable loans (bad loans) asymmetrically. We need to penalize firms for producing 
undesirable outputs and credit the desirable outputs in the model. The proxy for bad (problem) 
loans is loan-loss provision, which is introduced in the DEA model of Charnes et al. (1990) as 
an indicator of risks in banking operation. It is emphasized that although in the DEA model 
uncontrollable inputs are held fixed, in effect, this is at a bank’s discretion, as the management 
board is able to adjust the level of provision. Berg et al. (1992) introduce a model that captures 
NPLs directly in the bank production process using DEA. Chang (1999) uses a non-parametric 
approach to assess bank efficiency. But he extends the model by including risk to evaluate 
technical efficiencies of rural financial institutions in Taiwan. The proposed methodological 
framework treats risk as a joint but undesirable output.  Chang (1999) uses three categories of 
risk indicators (non-performing loans, allowance for loan losses, and risky assets) and finds that 
regulations on controlling risky assets and loan loss reserves are effective, although regulation is 
more problematic than controlling loan quality. Park and Weber (2006) examine how NPLs 
should be treated in the production process. They show that NPLs need to be considered as a 
bank undesirable output. Studies published by Fukuyama and Weber, (2008, 2010); Akther, 
Fukuyama and Weber (2013); Barros et al. (2012), Fujii et al. (2014) further expand this strand 
of research on bank efficiency. Fukuyama and Weber (2008) argue that problem loans are a 
by-product of loan production, and appear only after a loan has been made. Therefore, bad loans 
should be treated as an undesirable output. The most recent study by Fukuyama and Weber 
(2015a) develops a dynamic two-stage network model of the production process. In the first 
stage of production banks deploy three desirable inputs (labour, physical capital, and equity 
capital) to produce two intermediate outputs-deposits and other raised funds, they also 
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incorporate NPL into the model. The dynamic framework allows resources to be allocated over 
time to maximize the production of desirable outputs and simultaneously minimize the 
production of undesirable outputs. A further study by Fukuyama and Weber (2015b) proposes a 
dynamic network Luenberger productivity indicator for Japanese banks. Their dynamic 
approach also includes NPLs.  
In relation to the present study, the methods presented by Fukuyama and Weber (2015a) 
and Fukuyama and Weber (2015b) have two distinct characteristics: (1) a production 
(input-output) framework in which information on exogenously determined prices is not 
required; and (2) a dynamic framework with carryovers.  The present bank revenue function 
requires information on the exogenously determined prices of good and bad outputs.  This 
information allows us to estimate revenue (in)efficiency and the corresponding decompositions 
into (in)efficiency components.   Hence, this study requires additional data information but it 
provides an output target vector consistent with revenue maximization.    
Regarding dynamics, Fukuyama and Weber (2015a,b) constructed dynamic 
performance measures with the use of additional information on carryover assets, which need to 
be carefully defined.  The present study does not require carryovers because it is a static 
(non-dynamic) method. In any dynamic specification the length of time needs to be determined 
beforehand, but it is impractical to cover the lifetime of the asset (Emrouznejad and 
Thanassoulis 2005). The timescale affects the optimal path and efficiency estimates, and the 
present study avoids this limitation by the use of a static setting.    
It is possible to extend our model into a productivity change setting with the revenue 
function, in which case the technologies should be price dependent.  The results based on 
 13 
 
production and price-dependent technology specifications can be different and hence such an 
extension with a comparison of various methods will form the basis for interesting future 
research.    
Fethi and Pasiouras (2010) show in their survey that the majority of empirical research 
studies on bank efficiency that use the DEA framework focus on bank technical efficiency and 
to some extent on cost efficiency. There is a research gap in studies that examine profit/revenue 
efficiency with DEA. The reasons behind this are listed as the shortage of a good quality of 
output prices. A further argument is that the breakdown of profit efficiency into technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency is not a trivial problem. In addition, there is an extensive 
literature that tries to justify an appropriate selection of inputs/outputs in the production process. 
Following Berger and Humprey’s (1997) study, most empirical studies apply intermediation or a 
production approach to estimate bank efficiency. Further, Fethi and Pasourias (2010) provide 
evidence that the intermediation approach is the most used method in empirical research. One of 
the key issues is how to identify inputs/outputs correctly. In particular, what is the role of 
deposits in the production process? Drake et al. (2006, 2009) propose a modified approach 
called the profit-oriented approach. In this approach, revenue components are treated as outputs 
and cost components are defined as inputs. Most recent studies then introduce a two-stage 
approach. This approach overcomes the problem of the identification of deposits either as inputs 
or outputs. Studies by Fukuyama and Weber (2010), Fukuyama and Matousek (2011) and Holod 
and Lewis (2011) introduce a two-stage network system that treats deposits as an intermediate 
product in the bank production process.  
Based on this brief literature review, we have clearly identified gaps in the literature. 
 14 
 
First, the current studies that include NPLs directly within the model do not link NPLs with 
bank revenue and bank reserves. This has severe limitations since banks adjust their risk 
strategy to meet potential revenue and built up reserves. Second, the two-stage model 
overcomes the specific problems with the identification of deposits in the production process, as 
discussed by Fukuyama and Matousek (2011). Finally, there is a restricted number of studies 
that actually look at revenue efficiency in Japanese banks. Such an analysis undoubtedly 
contributes to policy decision debates regarding the impact of low revenue in the Regional Bank 
sector. 
 
4.  Methodology 
 
4.1. Black-box Technology and Revenue Function 
 
To provide the basics of black-box production technology, consider a production technology 
with an N-dimensional input vector Nx  , M-dimensional good output vector My   and 
L-dimensional bad output vector Lb  .  The bank production possibility set T  is denoted 
by: 
  ( , , ) ( , ) can be produced from N M LT x y b y b x        (1) 
Alternatively, T in (1) can be expressed as the output possibility correspondence : ( )NP P x  , 
denoted as: 
   ( ) , ( , , ) ,M L NP x y b x y b T x         (2) 
where ( )P x , called output possibility set, represents all good and bad output vectors that can be 
produced from a given level of inputs Nx  .  Hence, ( , ) ( )x y T y P x   .  We assume 
strong disposability of inputs (SDx ) and strong monotonicity of good outputs (SDy ):    
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SD : ( ) ( )
SD : and ( , ) ( ) for ( , ) ( )
x N M L
y M M L N
x x P x P x
y y y b P x x y b P x
  
   
       
         
. (3) 
The SDx  property states that if the exogenous input vector is increased from x to ,x  then the 
original bank output possibility set ( )P x  will be contained in the resulting bank output 
possibility set ( )P x .  The SDy  property states that if the good output vector is decreased 
from y  to y , then y  can still be produced for a given level of exogenous inputs and bad 
outputs.  
Now we distinguish between two types of good outputs in relation to bad outputs.  
One type consists of the good outputs jointly produced with bad outputs and the other is the 
good outputs whose production is not jointly a weak disposable with bad outputs.  We 
segregate, with respect to b, the good output vector y into two types: (1) the good output vector 
My 
  that causes production of bad outputs b ; and (2) the good output vector My 
  that 
does not, where M M M   .  That is, ( , ) M My y y    
   .  Following Shephard (1970) 
and Färe, Grosskopf and Weber (2006), we assume that y  and b  are jointly weakly 
disposable2:     
                                                  
2 This study differs from Fukuyama and Weber (2015a) since our focus is on NPLs with the use of the 
bank revenue function. The unique feature of our methodology is that we estimate the price of NPLs as 
the ratio of reserves for possible loan losses to NPLs.  These estimates allow us to gauge the bank 
revenue function which differs from the standard revenue function.  From a methodological point of 
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 JWD : ( , , ) ( ) for and 0 1
( , , ) ( )
M M L Ny y b P x x
y y b P x

 
          
 
  
 
  (4) 
The JWD property states that proportionally reduced connected good outputs and bad outputs are 
technologically feasible given a fixed level of exogenous inputs and non-joint good outputs.   
     Relative to (2), the bank directional output distance function ( , , ; )OD x y b g

=
( , , , ; , , )y y bOD x y y b g g g
      is denoted by:   
  ( , , , ; ) max ( , , ) ( )y y bOD x y y b y g y g b g P xg               (5) 
where 1 2( , ,..., )
y y y y M
Mg g g g  
   
 , 1 2( , ,..., )
y y y y M
Mg g g g  
   
  and 1 2( , ,..., )b b b bL Lg g g g    are 
directional vectors for good and bad outputs, respectively.  Note that  , ,y y bg g g g   .  Using 
(1) as the production technology, the bank revenue function is denoted as:3  
 
 
 
, ,
,
( , , , ) min ( , , b) ( ) , or
( , , ) min ( , ) ( )
y y b
y b
R x p p v py py vb y y P x
R x p v py vb y b P x
   
  
 
      
  (6) 
where 1 2 1 2( , ,..., ; , ,..., )
M M
MMp p p p p p p    



       is a positive good output price vector and
Lv   is a positive bad output price vector.  The inner products, py   and py , represent 
revenues from joint and non-joint good outputs, respectively.  The inner product vb  
represents the cost associated to bad outputs.  The objective py py vb     of (6) can be 
interpreted as an effective net benefit or revenue.  The bank revenue function is a bank 
revenue extension of Färe, Grosskopf and Weber’s (2006) environmental revenue function, 
                                                                                                                                                              
view, our bank revenue function has the following characteristics: good outputs linked or unlinked to 
NPLs as discussed by Epure and Lafuente (2015).  
3 Since ( , )p p p   , we have ( , , , ) ( , , )R x p p v R x p v  .   
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which does not distinguish the connected and unconnected outputs in their definition.  
Similar to the dual relationship established by Färe, Grosskopf and Weber (2006), the 
bank directional output distance functions (5) and (6) can be recovered from each other as 
follows: 
 
 
 
, ,
, ,
( , , , ) max ( , , , ; ) 0
( , , , )
( , , , ; ) min
Oy y b
o
O y y bp p v
R x p p v py py vb D x y y b
R x p p v py py vb
D x y y b
pg
g
g
pg vg
   
        
 
  

      
     
 
 
  (7) 
Equation (7) yields  
  ( , , , )( , , , ; ) oO y y b
R x p p v py py vb
D x y y b
pg pg v
g
g
  

  
     
 
 
  (8) 
which becomes the basis of our Nerlovian efficiency decompositions that are presented in the 
next section.   
 
 
4.2  Non-parametric Two-stage Network Technology and Revenue Function  
  
In this section we develop a non-parametric or DEA two-stage network bank technology 
framework, where the term ‘two-stage network bank technology’ shows that all outputs of a 
bank’s first stage enter into a second stage.  Assume that there are J banks, Bank ( 1,..., )j j J  
with N exogenous inputs, M M M    final good outputs, and Q  intermediate products.  
Define the observed amounts of exogenous inputs, joint good outputs, non-joint good outputs, 
bad outputs and intermediate products of Bank j  by  0 1,...,njx n N  ,  0 1,...,mjy m M    , 
 0 1,...,mjy m M    ,  0 1,...,hjb h H   and  0 1,...,qjz q Q  , respectively.  Define the 
intensity vectors for the two stages as 1 1 11( ,..., ) JJ      and 2 2 21( ,..., ) JJ      for the 
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purpose of taking into account the two-stage structure in a non-parametric DEA framework 
(Figure 1).   
 
The stage one technology is represented by: 
        1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
, , , 1, 0
J J J
n nj j qj j q j j
j j j
T x z x x n z z q j   
  
          
  
     (9) 
and stage 2 technology by:  
  
     
     
2 2 2
1 1 12
2 2 2
1 1
, ,
, , ,
, 1, 0 , 1 0 .
J J J
qj j q m mj j j m mj j
j j j
J J
l lj j j j j j
j j
z z q y y m y y m
T z y y b
b b l j j
   
    
  
 
       
   
          
  
 
       
    (10) 
where each stage exhibits variable returns to scale.  Note, that with the good outputs y  are 
jointly produced with bad outputs b, which are implemented with the use of an abatement factor
[0,1]j  .  See Kuosmanen (2005) for this abatement factor in a general setting.  Note that 
Shephard (1974) and Färe and Grosskopf (2003, 2009) assumed  j j   .  Recently, 
Epure and Lafuente (2015) have distinguished between y  and y and developed a black-box 
DEA production model for a bank.   
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Figure 1. Two-stage Network Process for a Japanese Bank 
 
 
 Intermediate  product:  depositsz   
Stage 1
Fund-raising process
 
Stage 2
loan/investment process
 
 bad outputs: various nonperforming loansb   
 Jointly produced good output: loansy   
 
Non-joinlty produced good output:
securities investmentsy   
labor
Exogenous inputs:
capital
x    
 
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The constraints associated with the intermediate product q  are represented by 1
1
J
qj j q
j
z z

  and 
2
1
J
qj j q
j
z z

  in Stage 1 and Stage 2, respectively, under the assumption of strong disposability.  
Combining these constraints, we can write  1 2 1 2
1 1 1
0
J J J
qj j q qj j qj j j
j j j
z z z z   
  
        under 
the assumption that all the intermediate products are produced and consumed within a bank. Note 
that some of the intermediate products in Stage 1 can be wasted within a bank.  The two-stage 
network production possibility set is given by: 
  
     
   
   
1 2 2
1 1 1
2 1 2 1 2
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 
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  
   
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 (11) 
Relative to (11), the directional bank output distance function for Bank o is denoted as: 
 
   
 
 
 
   
1 1 2
1 1
2
1
2
1
2 1 2
1 1 1
1 2
, 0,
,
, , , ; max ,
, 1, 1,
0, 0 , 1 0 ,
J J
no nj j qj j jj j
Jy
mo m mj j jj
Jy
o o o o mo m mj jj
J J Jb
lo l lj j j j jj j j
j j j
x x n z
y g y m
ND x y y b g y g y m
b g b l
j j
  
  
  
    
   
 


  
   
  
   
    
     
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: free
 
 
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 
 
 
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 (12) 
 
where  ymg m  ,  ymg m   and  blg l  represent the inefficiency measurement directions for 
linked outputs, unlinked outputs and bad outputs, respectively. Since (12) is a non-linear 
programme, we transform it into a linear programme by Kuosmanen’s (2005) transformation 
procedure.  That is, setting  1 1j j j   ,    21j j j j      and  2 2j j j j    , Equation 
(12) can be expressed as:   
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 (13) 
Using (11) as the network technology, the network revenue function for Bank o under 
assessment takes the form: 
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 (14) 
 
which can be thought of as a two-stage network DEA version of Färe, Grosskopf and Weber’s 
(2006) parametric revenue function. The bank network revenue function ( , , , )oNR x p p v   is also 
an extension of Fukuyama and Matousek’s (2011) two-stage network cost function, which did 
not incorporate bad outputs. Similar to the transformation based on the directional bank output 
distance function, we set  1 1j j j   ,    21j j j j      and  2 2j j j j     to obtain a 
linear programme equivalent to (14) as 
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. (15) 
Extending the duality results of Chambers, Chung and Färe (1999) and Färe, Grosskopf, Noh 
and Weber (2005), we can obtain the following inequality: 
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The left-hand-side of (16) is a Nerlovian expression of a two-stage network version of revenue 
inefficiency (see (8)) and the right-hand side represents a two-stage network version of 
technical inefficiency.  Defining the deviation between the left-hand side and the right-hand 
side of (16) as allocative inefficiency AE, we obtain the following decomposition: 
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which states that normalized revenue inefficiency is broken down into directional output 
inefficiency and allocative inefficiency. The left-hand-side of (17) is a Nerlovian expression of 
revenue inefficiency.   
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5.  Data and Empirical Results 
 
The sample includes Regional Banks I and II that operated in Japan from 2001 to 2013. The 
source of our database is the Japanese Banks’ Association (JBA). The database includes all 
operating banks and is more representative than data that are available from BankScope. The 
time period of our analysis is much longer than published by the previous research studies. 
Empirical studies generally apply two approaches when measuring bank outputs and 
costs and these have been extensively discussed in Sealey and Lindley (1977), Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) and recently by Berger et al. (2007) and Kauko (2009). The production 
approach considers that banks produce accounts of various sizes by processing deposits and 
loans, incurring capital and labour costs. The intermediation approach defines banks as 
transformers of deposits and purchased funds into loans and other assets. The application of 
these two approaches usually depends on the availability of data and the purpose of the study. 
We apply here an innovative intermediation approach (Fukuyama and Matousek, 2011). In a 
bank context, we need to decide whether deposits (or raised funds) are an input or output 
because there is a controversy in the bank efficiency literature4 . However, conventional 
efficiency analysis uses deposits either as an input or output.  By contrast, the deposits are an 
output in the first stage of production and an input in the second stage in the two-stage network 
                                                  
4 Regarding the treatment of NPLs in efficiency analysis, in some banking efficiency literature NPLs are 
considered to be an input and performing loans an output. See Paradi et al. (2011).  While Paradi et 
al.’s (2011) study considers bank branch efficiency performance measurement, the framework is also 
applicable to bank efficiency measurement.   
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model.  
The input and output variables are in line with already established research on bank 
efficiency that uses DEA. In our study we apply the same definitions and variables as used by 
Fukuyama and Matousek (2011). The input vector includes the number of employees5 and the 
second input is capital, which is defined as the book value of premises and fixed assets. In our 
model we include intermediate output that is represented by deposits. The output then includes 
loans and securities. Table 1 displays the list of all variables used in the model.  
 
Table 1 Defined Inputs, Outputs and Prices 
1x  Labor =Number of workers 
2x  Physical capital = Premises and real estate 
1z   
Intermediate product 1 =Deposits 
y   Performing loans (jointly produced 
good output) linked to NPLs 
= Performing loans 
y   Good output not linked to bads = Securities investment 
b   Bad output = Nonperforming loans 
p   Price of y  = (interest income) / y  
p   Price of y  = (interest income) / y  
v   Price of b  = (Reserve for possible loan losses)/NPLs 
 
We have also manually cleaned our dataset since some variables were missing. We 
deleted Bank of Nagasaki for September 2010, March 2011, September 2011, March 2012, 
September 2012 and March 2013 because it does not report the price of securities y  for these 
                                                  
5 The number of employees for individual banks is available only on the Japanese webpage of JBA.  
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periods. We also deleted Bank of Ishikawa for the period September 2002 because 1x , b, 
reserves were not reported. Finally, we obtained variable labour (x1) for Ishikawa Bank for 
September 2000 as the average of March 2000 and March 2001. 
When we estimated eq. 13, some observations had zero optimal values for performing 
loans y  and non-performing loans b , where y  and b  are singletons for our data.  As an 
efficiency target, this is not acceptable because a commercial bank’s main activity is lending. 
Therefore, we append the following in eq.13:   
 
 y y  .  (18) 
Examining our data set shows that all banks with the exception of the Tokyo Star Bank 
for September 2001 had results with performing loans greater than securities investments.  
Furthermore, Kansai Sawayaka Bank had ( , , , )oNR x p p v  = * * * 0y y b     for March 2001.  
This is the only bank that shows such characteristics.   
In the following part, we present the estimates of the model that we introduced in the 
previous section. As previously stated, the proposed two-stage network model captures a 
production process more comprehensively. In particular, we may quantify how banks have to 
change their business activities in order to maximize their revenue. Such an analysis provides 
more meaningful results than reporting standard efficiency levels.  
Table 2 reports differences between optimal and actual levels of both outputs, 
non-performing loans and revenue. The term ‘optimal’ means that the optimal values are based 
on the bank revenue function with NPLs and are part of a bank’s revenue. The introduced 
 26 
 
methodological framework gives an optimal amount of reserves for loan losses, which are the 
price of NPLs multiplied by the ‘optimal’ amount of NPLs derived from the bank revenue 
maximization.   
We calculate these changes for individual years. This helps us to capture the dynamic 
behaviour of the observed banks. First, we report the results for both groups, i.e. Regional 
Banks I and II. The result presented shows that the banks, on average, operated close to the 
optimal level for the volume of loans (y1) and had only marginal room for expansion. In order 
to achieve an optimal level of loans, banks should have expanded their loans by 1 per cent and 4 
per cent in 2001 and 2002, respectively. This is in contrast with the second output, securities, 
which are substantially below the optimal level. We can see that the banks could expand 
securities almost three times in the early 2000s. At the same time, the banks still faced a 
problem with NPLs. The average gap between optimal and actual levels of NPLs is estimated in 
2000. The difference is -43 per cent. The output mix of y1/y2 has been reduced since 2005 
because banks rapidly reduced lending activities. This had a positive effect on the volume of 
NPLs. However, these adjustments in banks’ activities affected bank revenue when the gap 
between optimal and actually deteriorated. In 2012, bank revenue was 2.12 times lower than the 
optimal level. Our data indicates that banks benefited from the early restructuring policy 
implemented by the authorities in the early 2000s, see, for example, Montgomery and 
Shimizutani (2009), Hoshi and Kashyap (2010). That policy could have led to an improvement 
in the gap between optimal and actual that dropped in the following year to 1.44. Since then we 
can see again a gradual deepening between optimal and actual levels for revenue and both 
outputs. Our results show that the actual level of NPLs was lower than the optimal one. The gap 
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was then gradually reduced and, from 2006, we can see that the actual volume of NPLs has 
been smaller than the optimal values, except for the years 2008 and 2009. 
A further step in our analysis is to explore the differences between Regional Banks I 
and II. Although both groups conduct similar activities, we may expect that their efficiency 
levels differ. In particular, the restructuring process of Regional Banks II was not financially 
supported in the same way as Regional Banks I, because Regional Banks II had to cope with the 
accumulated loans by themselves.   
We split our results into two groups. The first analysis concentrates on the period from 
2001 to 2007, and the second covers the period from 2008 to 2013. Table 2 shows that Regional 
Banks I, on average, operated at almost an optimal level in terms of loans (y1) in 2001 and 2002. 
The gap between optimal and actual level in terms of loans was -10 per cent and 5 per cent in 
2001 and 2002, respectively. This is similar to Regional Banks II, where the gap in the first two 
years of our analysis was 3 per cent and 11 per cent. We can also observe a gap between optimal 
and actual NPLs in the Regional Banks I segment. Regional Banks II show the gap of -0.41 and 
-0.44, respectively, between optimal and actual NPLs in 2001. It is further evident that both 
groups reported a large gap in the use of output y2 (securities). The gap is more pronounced in 
the Regional Banks II segment where the difference between optimal levels and actual levels of 
securities (y2) is almost 4.23 higher than in Regional Banks I. This finding can be partially 
explained by the fact that Regional Banks in general were historically more focused on lending 
activities compared to large City Banks. The results in the first years of our analysis also reflect 
the introduction of quantitative easing in Japan. This helped banks to get new funding for 
making loans but, on the other hand, it dried up their bonds and securities that were purchased 
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by the Bank of Japan.  
 
Table 2 Regional Banks (all) – Optimal vs Actual levels (% changes) 
 opt-act(rev) opt-act (y1) opt-act(y2) opt-act(bad) 
2001 Average 3.93 -0.01 2.47 -0.43 
 STD 19.54 0.36 2.48 0.34 
2002 Average 5.61 0.04 2.82 -0.35 
 STD 52.80 0.38 2.83 0.41 
2003 Average 1.65 0.14 3.52 -0.27 
 STD 59.73 0.41 3.85 0.47 
2004 Average 0.62 0.12 2.92 -0.21 
 STD 23.12 0.38 2.58 0.45 
2005 Average 2.12 0.19 2.71 -0.20 
 STD 21.17 0.38 2.41 0.38 
2006 Average 1.44 0.11 2.34 -0.08 
 STD 21.65 0.83 2.14 0.59 
2007 Average 3.55 0.39 2.11 -0.10 
 STD 12.02 0.46 1.70 0.37 
2008 Average 2.35 0.29 2.48 0.06 
 STD 17.57 0.39 2.15 0.37 
2009 Average 1.88 0.23 1.70 0.45 
 STD 16.63 0.45 1.70 0.50 
2010 Average 1.27 0.28 1.77 -0.02 
 STD 26.71 0.64 1.55 0.60 
2011 Average -0.12 0.53 1.67 0.50 
 STD 38.15 0.47 2.09 0.12 
2012 Average 3.50 0.47 2.09 0.12 
 STD 12.18 0.61 2.03 0.61 
2013 Average 3.33 0.47 2.28 0.19 
 STD 8.47 0.56 2.02 0.53 
 
 
Tables 3 and 4 indicate the successful reduction in the volume of NPLs by 2007. In 
addition, we observe from Tables 3 and 4 that bank revenues are quite different between 
Regional Banks I and II. It is obvious that bank revenues are well below an optimal level. 
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Although Regional Banks I performed relatively well, we observe that the gap between optimal 
and actual level was gradually narrowing until 2007. The banks operated only 27 per cent below 
estimated optimal level in 2007. Alternatively, the results for Regional Banks II indicate that 
these banks operated significantly below an optimal level in terms of bank revenues. This was 
particularly pronounced in the early 2000s when the gap reached the value of 3.61 in 2003. 
After this time we observe a gradual improvement in bank revenues and NPLs. 
 
Table 3 Regional Banks I – Optimal vs Actual levels (% changes) 
 opt-act(rev) opt-act (y1) opt-act(y2) opt-act(bad) 
2001 Average 0.60 -0.10 1.20 -0.41 
 STD 14.27 0.35 0.97 0.38 
2002 Average 0.78 0.05 1.36 -0.50 
 STD 10.64 0.34 1.22 0.32 
2003 Average 1.54 0.12 1.70 -0.43 
 STD 21.89 0.38 1.66 0.41 
2004 Average -2.77 0.12 1.48 -0.40 
 STD 21.80 0.37 1.32 0.39 
2005 Average -1.61 0.15 1.34 -0.36 
 STD 21.73 0.33 1.22 0.38 
2006 Average -0.26 0.91 1.21 -0.16 
 STD 28.85 1.28 1.18 0.73 
2007 Average 2.38 0.32 1.21 -0.22 
 STD 12.44 0.35 0.97 0.35 
2008 Average 2.53 0.22 1.53 -0.05 
 STD 5.79 0.33 1.08 0.33 
2009 Average 3.53 0.23 1.26 -0.09 
 STD 10.88 0.38 1.00 0.36 
2010 Average 3.78 0.55 1.03 -0.14 
 STD 17.65 1.14 1.02 0.50 
2011 Average 3.34 0.32 1.11 -0.21 
 STD 11.92 0.50 1.10 0.43 
2012 Average 1.26 0.52 1.36 -0.01 
 STD 6.66 0.57 1.62 0.50 
2013 Average 2.01 0.40 1.73 0.11 
 STD 2.16 0.45 2.04 0.50 
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Table 4 Regional Banks II – Optimal vs Actual levels (% changes) 
 opt-act(rev) opt-act (y1) opt-act(y2) opt-act(bad) 
2001 Average 5.37 0.03 3.05 -0.44 
 STD 21.38 0.36 2.71 0.33 
2002 Average -1.06 0.11 3.35 -0.29 
 STD 26.75 0.37 3.07 0.43 
2003 Average 1.62 0.24 4.23 -0.21 
 STD 21.24 0.40 4.25 0.44 
2004 Average 0.72 0.19 3.47 -0.14 
 STD 21.08 0.35 2.74 0.44 
2005 Average 3.61 0.27 3.25 -0.14 
 STD 20.89 0.36 2.59 0.37 
2006 Average 2.13 0.58 2.80 -0.04 
 STD 18.12 0.76 2.28 0.53 
2007 Average 2.82 0.45 2.47 -0.05 
 STD 42.11 0.46 1.79 0.37 
2008 Average 2.28 0.36 2.86 0.11 
 STD 20.60 0.40 1.87 0.38 
2009 Average 1.19 0.30 3.36 0.08 
 STD 18.50 0.47 1.81 0.48 
2010 Average 0.19 0.35 2.13 0.03 
 STD 29.85 0.65 1.69 0.63 
2011 Average -1.66 0.32 2.28 -0.05 
 STD 45.20 0.53 1.85 0.53 
2012 Average 4.50 0.56 2.50 0.17 
 STD 13.89 0.60 2.13 0.64 
2013 Average 3.94 0.59 2.53 0.22 
 STD 10.14 0.56 1.99 0.54 
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We also investigate how Regional Banks operated during the global financial crisis in 
reaction to the economic downturn. In the group of Regional Banks I we observe that the gap 
between the optimal and actual level of loans has rather improved compared to 2007. Although 
we see a gradual deterioration when the gap reached the value of 52 per cent and 40 per cent in 
2012 and 2013. A similar pattern is observed in terms of securities (y2 ) where we can clearly 
see an increase in 2013. Nevertheless banks manage to keep their NPLs well below an optimal 
level. We further observe that the proportion of held securities was rather marginal in the 
Regional Banks II group. So far we have discussed the estimated gap between optimal and 
actual levels of bank revenue, inputs and NPLs. In the following part we shed light on bank 
efficiency. As we discussed in our methodological section, we apply Nerlove’s revenue 
inefficiency measure (NRI) that is further broken down into technical and allocative inefficiency. 
In Table 5 we report our results for the average value of NRI on a yearly basis and for both 
groups of banks, Regional Banks I and Regional Banks II. It is evident that the measured levels 
of NRI are relatively high, which indicates that Regional Banks operated below the optimal 
efficiency levels, although we observe an improvement in the Regional Banks I segment in the 
period from 2007 to 2011. In the case of Regional Banks I and II, there was an improvement 
particularly in 2009 and 2010. A further interesting finding is that the number of banks that 
show NRI higher than the average remains constant for Regional Banks I. There was only a 
marginal improvement in 2010, 2011 and 2013. In the Regional Banks II group, we also see the 
number of banks with NRI above average drops over the estimated period but this just reflects 
the lower number of Regional Banks II in the sample. In percentage terms there is no significant 
improvement.  
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Table 5 Nerlove’s Inefficiency RB I and RBII 
 RB I   RB II   
2001 NIE Total NIE>AVG NIE Total NIE>AVG 
Average 0.36 72 32 0.48 166 60 
STD 0.21   0.36   
2002  
Average 0.48 64 27 0.52 172 79 
STD 0.28   0.30   
2003  
Average 0.51 64 23 0.58 172 73 
STD 0.29   0.30   
2004  
Average 0.47 63 22 0.55 165 67 
STD 0.27   0.30   
2005  
Average 0.45 64 22 0.52 158 52 
STD 0.34   0.28   
2006  
Average 0.41 64 26 0.50 159 69 
STD 0.23   0.26   
2007  
Average 0.35 64 27 0.46 157 86 
STD 0.19   0.25   
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2008  
Average 0.37 63 24 0.52 154 72 
STD 0.22   0.28   
2009  
Average 0.32 64 22 0.46 157 86 
STD 0.20   0.24   
2010  
Average 0.31 64 22 0.43 148 76 
STD 0.20   0.24   
2011  
Average 0.32 64 20 0.47 144 66 
STD 0.20   0.26   
2012  
Average 0.39 64 25 0.55 144 44 
STD 0.27   0.29   
2013  
Average 0.44 64 22 0.61 142 44 
STD 0.37   0.36   
 
In Table 6 we break NRI down into technical inefficiency (TIE) and allocative 
inefficiency (AIE). We report that the main source of bank inefficiency is TIE in the segment of 
Regional Banks I (the number of banks that report TIE>AIE). TIE has gradually decreased over 
the analyzed period but we further observe a relatively difficult period since 2008. This may be 
the effect of the global financial crisis. Conversely, Regional Banks I report a gradual 
improvement of the analyzed period. Regional Banks II report rather opposite results. The 
largest number of banks show that the main source of their inefficiency is AIE. We observe that 
Regional Banks II improved their TIE until 2010. Then we observe a steep increase in TIE.  
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Table 6 Allocative Inefficiency (AIE) and Technical Inefficiency (TIE) and number of 
banks with AIE and number of banks with TIE 
RB I TIE AIE #AIE #TIE RB II TIE AIE #AIE #TIE 
2001  
Average 0.23 0.13 26 44  0.22 0.26 97 60 
STD 0.19 0.21 2eq   0.18 0.29   
2002  
Average 0.25 0.22 24 40  0.25 0.28 101 74 
STD 0.20 0.28    0.19 0.17   
2003  
Average 0.26 0.24 28 36  0.26 0.32 111 61 
STD 0.21 0.29    0.20 0.16   
2004  
Average 0.24 0.23 23 40  0.26 0.21 95 70 
STD 0.18 0.30    0.19 0.30   
2005  
Average 0.25 0.20 23 41  0.25 0.27 95 63 
STD 0.17 0.36    0.20 0.15   
2006  
Average 0.27 0.14 22 42  0.24 0.26 97 62 
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STD 0.20 0.25    0.20 0.16   
2007  
Average 0.22 0.13 21 43  0.22 0.24 103 54 
STD 0.16 0.19    0.19 0.15   
2008  
Average 0.20 0.17 27 36  0.21 0.31 116 38 
STD 0.14 0.19    0.18 0.20   
2009  
Average 0.17 0.32 22 42  0.20 0.26 101 52 
STD 0.11 0.20    0.16 0.17   
2010  
Average 0.18 0.12 18 46  0.21 0.23 86 62 
STD 0.13 0.19    0.17 0.15   
2011  
Average 0.19 0.12 19 45  0.20 0.26 91 53 
STD 0.14 0.17    0.16 0.23   
2012  
Average 0.20 0.19 26 38  0.21 0.34 102 42 
STD 0.14 0.26    0.16 0.22   
2013  
Average 0.17 0.26 38 26  0.21 0.40 111 32 
STD 0.13 0.36    0.15 0.27   
 
 
Finally, we conducted a second stage regression analysis using the procedure 
developed by Chronopoulos et al. (2015) to identify the covariates of the Nerlovian revenue 
inefficiency.  We briefly explain the two-stage regression analysis employed in this paper.  
Let ˆ  be an estimator of an unknown scalar parameter  .   Now we want to construct a 
two-sided conﬁdence interval for  .  The 100(1 ) % basic bootstrap conﬁdence interval 
with nominal coverage of 1 2  is expressed as     
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ,
 
     

      
 , where 
 
1
ˆ

 

  is the (1 ) -quantile of ˆ   and the left-hand and right-hand side terms in the 
brackets are lower and higher confidence bounds, respectively.  The corresponding percentile 
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conﬁdence interval can be written as 1ˆ ˆ,      , where ˆ  is the  -quantile of ˆ .  In this 
paper, we estimate the basic (rather than percentile) interval based on bootstrap, i.e., we 
estimate the following:    * * * *
((1 )( 1)) ( ( 1))
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ,
B B 
     
  
      
, where B is the number of 
bootstraps and the subscripts in parentheses denote ordered values and (1 )( 1)B   is an 
integer.  See Chronopoulos et al. (2015) for details. 
The set of independent variables in our model includes: capitalization, which is defined 
as the ratio of total capital to assets and net interest margin (NIM) that is defined as net interest 
income to total loans and Industrial Index, Z-score, as a measurement of bank risk.6 In addition 
we have a variable that measures the volume of bankrupt loans (BRL). We computed all the 
coefficients by using the proposed method. We also transformed the Nerlovian Revenue indicator 
(NR) into its adjusted indicator as7 1adjNR NR   so that the left-hand side of the regression is 
greater than, or equal to, one.  
 
Table 7 Confidence Intervals: Efficiency Determinants 
 Lower bound 
based on single  
bootstrap 
Upper bound 
based on single  
bootstrap 
Lower bound 
based on double  
bootstrap 
Upper bound 
based on double  
bootstrap 
(Intercept) -0.469568564 1.373468476 0.84565149 1.167879794 
Cap -2.487593224 -1.348793457 -2.753389914 -2.753389914 
NIM -13.65430071 6.744571263 -7.051704043 -4.62213586 
lnIndustrial.index 0.113158735 0.497840849 0.540162647 0.665990158 
                                                  
6 Z-score is used as the determinants of bank risk-taking. See, for example, Lepetit and Strobel (2013). 
7 This condition is needed to use the dBoot.RData programme. 
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Z-score -0.005139465 -0.003584962 -0.005566245 -0.005566245 
lnBRL -0.044387756 -0.012361133 -0.050634288 -0.050634288 
Sigma 0.351725507 0.380552993 0.392106976 0.392106976 
 
Table 7 presents for comparison reasons the confidence intervals of the coefficients of 
the effect of the exogenous (environmental) factors based on the standard single bootstrap 
procedure (see Simar and Wilson 2007) and double bootstrap procedure (see Chronopoulos et al. 
2015). It is evident that in all cases the confidence intervals estimated using the single bootstrap 
procedure have a greater range compared to the ones estimated when applying the double 
bootstrap procedure.  For the single bootstrap procedure, the lower interval is negative whereas 
the higher is positive. In fact as Chronopoulos et al. (2015, p. 661) suggest in cases where the 
sum of inputs and outputs are greater than 3 the convergence of the confidence intervals 
calculated with the single bootstrap procedure is non-monotonic, suggesting an increase in the 
coverage error. As a result, we adopt the confidence intervals calculated based on the double 
bootstrap procedure. The results suggest that all the signs of the coefficient are aligned with the 
related literature. 
    
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to current research on bank efficiency by introducing an advanced 
two-stage model to estimate bank revenue efficiency. The proposed model uniquely combines 
NPLs with the bank revenue function. The paper improves the established methodological 
concept of a two-stage model that has already been introduced in the bank efficiency literature 
(Fukuyama and Weber 2008, Fukuyama and Matousek 2011). The applied methodological 
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approach allows us to compare optimal levels of revenue, NPLs and bank outputs with actual 
levels. Thus, we can identify banks that operate below their optimal capacity. The majority of 
studies on Japanese bank efficiency focus primarily on allocative efficiency. The paper goes 
further by implementing the concept of Nerlove’s revenue indicator. The inclusion of NPLs in 
our model is justified by a number of recent studies, e.g., Assaf et al. (2013), Fujii et al. (2014), 
among others. 
We show that Japanese Regional Banks have not achieved the optimal levels in their 
production processes. In terms of NPLs, it is evident that the gap between optimal levels and 
actual levels of NPLs have significantly decreased and became even positive from 2005 
onwards. That reflects the restructuring process undertaken by the Regional Banks in the early 
2000s when the banks’ NPLs were written off. There is further evidence of a substantial gap 
between the optimal level and actual level of y2 (securities and other earning assets). The results 
indicate that Regional Banks, and in particular Regional Banks II, should expand their activities 
in securities and other earning assets. Bank management should address this specific issue of 
underproduction. In terms of the output y1 (loans) the bank can also expand their activities. But 
the reluctance of banks to expand their lending activities corresponds with the high levels of 
uncertainty about the financial stability of potential borrowers. Our analysis shows that 
Regional Banks I achieved suboptimal revenue. The peak gap between optimal and actual levels 
of bank revenue is 3.53 and 3.78 times lower than the optimal level in 2009 and 2010 
respectively. This gap reduced in 2012 and 2013. We may assume that the estimated suboptimal 
revenue is not only because of banks’ managerial policy and strategy, but also reflects economic 
uncertainties. The Regional Banks in particularly do not want to reduce the volume of newly 
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created NPLs. We explore our results further in our analysis. We compare, for example, the 
differences between Regional Banks I and II in order to understand if there are some substantial 
differences. As previously mentioned, Regional Banks II are smaller and they did not receive 
substantial financial support from the Japanese Government during the consolidation process, as 
was the case with other banks. We confirm that both types of Regional Banks have recovered 
and created sufficient reserves to cope with potential NPLs. However, the gaps between optimal 
and actual revenue are substantially different between these two groups of banks. Regional 
Banks II show a much bigger difference. This might be explained further by their business 
activities and their limited exposure to other earning assets, compared to Regional Banks I. 
An important contribution of the paper is the application of Nerlove’s revenue indicator 
to analyze the revenue inefficiency of Regional Banks in Japan during the period from 2001 to 
2013. Nerlove’s inefficiency indicator allows us to disaggregate bank inefficiency into 
directional output inefficiency (technical efficiency) and allocative inefficiency. In addition we 
are able to identify whether revenue inefficiency is caused by technical or allocative inefficiency. 
We show that Regional Banks II exhibit relatively high degrees of AIE after 2011. The main 
source of bank inefficiency comes from allocative efficiency. These results indicate that bank 
managers have to improve the cost aspects of their operation. Based on the nature of Reginal 
Banks’ activities, it is evident that banks have a large volume of fixed assets, particularly offices 
and branches. The optimalization of branches would also lead at the same time to further 
reduction of labour costs. It is well documented that the Japanese banks are quite labour cost 
inefficient, Barros et al. (2012). We also identify that the banks would benefit from higher 
exposure to other earning assets that could lead to revenue improvement. In addition, such an 
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analysis can be easily applied to US and European banking, where banks are still affected by a 
large volume of NPLs.  
An interesting direction for future research would be to examine the regional differences 
between Regional Banks I and II. The Japanese banks are still rather conservative in terms of 
credit expansion and further restructuring. Since Regional Banks operate within the prefectures 
we try to identify if there are geographical differences among the prefectures. This would also 
help to verify a hypothesis that banks’ activities are determined by economic development 
across Japan. It would be interesting to confirm that the geographical location of those banks 
has an impact on their efficiency. One may expect that banks located in the prefectures with 
lower economic growth potential might show lower efficiency.  Future data might also reveal 
current trends in the sector. So far the results show that banks are less efficient. This trend is 
probably caused by further economic instability that prevents banks from further expansion. As 
we show banks’ outputs have potential for further growth. The suboptimal outputs thus have an 
impact on banks’ revenues and might improve bank revenue and efficiency. Bank expansion, in 
terms of new loans and other earning assets, is also determined by the Bank of Japan and the 
use of its unconventional monetary policy tools. New data then could provide a deeper insight 
into the current trend about bank efficiency and revenue. Despite the fact that governments and 
central banks introduced a number of measures to restore economic growth, banks are rather 
reluctant to expand their business. We may, however, conclude that in terms of bank soundness 
that the banks have successfully consolidated and restructured their activities. 
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